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A right to truth, victims and the International Criminal Court 
Mass graves were the key topic of the Feb-April issue of this magazine. It was 
pointed out there, how important it is for families of victims to know what happened 
to their loved ones. This need to know the truth is mirrored in international law 
through the emergence of ‘the right to truth’; this right is the focus of the following 
contribution. In particular the question is whether victims participating in the 
proceedings at the International Criminal Court in The Hague can argue for the 
realisation of this right. Originally based in the Geneva Conventions and relating 
specifically to the issue of missing persons during both international and internal 
armed conflict, the right to truth was developed in the 1970s through the case law of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the work of intergovernmental 
bodies as a response to the problem of enforced disappearances, and in particular, 
to the need of the families of the missing to know the fate or whereabouts of relatives 
or loved ones. 
The right of victims and their families within this context has been widely recognised 
by regional and international bodies, including the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, which entered into force in December 2010, affirms the right to truth 
in the specific context of forced disappearance.  
While the right to truth was initially developed in relation to missing persons and 
those subjected to enforced disappearance, its application has since been 
broadened to encompass other serious violations of human rights law, including 
torture and extrajudicial killings.1 In an attempt to clarify whether the right to truth has 
an effective place in the context of international criminal justice, specifically the 
International Criminal Court, an empirical study into stakeholder attitudes was 
conducted.2 After outlining the nature of the right, the contribution here will 
summarise some of the findings from this study on the right to truth.  
                                                          
1 Ignacio Ellacuría et al v. El Salvador, IACHR, Report No. 136/99, 12 December 1999, para. 221. 
2 The research employed semi-structured, in depth, interviews with 23 individuals from the Office of the 
Prosecutor, judges, defence lawyers, court advisors, victim representatives and NGO representatives between 
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What is the material scope of the right to truth?  
The right to truth encompasses the right to seek and obtain information relating to 
the reasons and causes which lead to the victimisation of the individual(s) 
concerned, together with the prevailing conditions, circumstances and reasons which 
lead to or otherwise facilitated the gross violation of human rights more generally. 
The right also encompasses the acquisition of information concerning the particular 
circumstances in which specific violations took place, including the facts of those 
violations themselves and, in the event of death or enforced disappearance, the fate 
and whereabouts of those involved. Finally, the right encompasses knowledge as to 
the progress and results of the State investigation into the matter, together with the 
identity of the perpetrators. 
Why does this right matter? 
The right to the truth about gross human rights violations reflects a fundamental 
need for victims and their families, and arises as a result of the State’s positive duty 
to protect and guarantee their rights. At a societal level, the right to truth exists as a 
means of ensuring transparency, ending impunity and protecting human rights. In a 
recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court acknowledged the 
societal relevance of the right to truth, noting its significance in strengthening public 
confidence in the workings of State institutions and the rule of law more generally. In 
addition, the Court found that knowledge of the truth was instrumental in breaking 
down what it described as ‘the wall of silence and the cloak of secrecy’3 that 
prevented victims from understanding what had happened to them and hindered 
their recovery.  
Normally it is the State who should enforce this right by providing a full and 
comprehensive investigation, for example. But  according to an early decision of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ‘[i]nternational 
criminal justice…must pursue its mission of revealing the truth about the acts 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
November 2012 and May 2013. We are very grateful to all participants and the Nuffield Foundation for funding 
the project. 
3 El-Masri v The former  Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ECtHR, Application no. 39630/09, 12 December 2012, 
Joint concurring opinion, para 6. 
3 
 
perpetrated and suffering endured, as well as identifying and arresting those 
accused of responsibility’.4 The truth-seeking function of the Court begins prior to the 
conduct of any trial, and includes a period of investigation, evidence-gathering and 
verification of charges. For the purpose of conducting its investigation into alleged 
offences, international criminal law mechanisms, unlike their human rights 
counterparts, operate within the territories of the abusing States, and as such, have 
first-hand access to evidential materials, including those which might assist in 
answering the many questions that victims and their families have in the aftermath of 
atrocities. Despite the truth-seeking function of the international criminal tribunals, 
however, their primary goal remains the determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. So the question is: to what extent can the right be realised as a 
secondary goal at the ICC? 
The right to truth and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Operational since 2002, the ICC is the first permanent institution for trialling 
international crimes. Importantly, apart from being permanent and attempting to 
close the impunity gap across the world for crimes committed at the times that the 
court already existed, the ICC builds upon the respect for international human rights. 
Article 21 and 67 of the Rome Statute, for example, build upon accepted standards 
of human rights for the conduct of a trial. In addition the International Criminal Court 
has two innovative features: firstly it allows for victim participation during the 
proceedings and secondly it has a mandate to develop reparative principles. 
The question as to whether the right to truth is of relevance to the ICC is justified for 
a number of reasons:  
Firstly, the Rome Statute provides for victim participation. It is the victims in which 
the right is vested, although it should be noted that victims do not become a party to 
the proceedings. Furthermore, the rights and powers of victims and the modalities of 
their participation are not expressed with clarity and so are left to the judges to 
develop.  
                                                          
4 Prosecutor v Karadžić and Mladić, IT-95-5-R6, IT-95-18-R61 Review of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, 3. 
4 
 
Also relevant is the Prosecutor’s investigative duty which comprises an obligation to 
seek to establish the truth, and in particular, to consider whether there might be 
criminal responsibility under the terms of the Statute. In addition, Art 69(3) includes a 
truth-finding provision for the judges. 
Secondly, the law applicable to the ICC arguably includes the right to the truth in 
some sense. Article 21(1), through its hierarchical list of applicable law, does permit 
recourse to ‘applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict’ and 
through this take the right to truth into consideration. 
Thirdly, Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute defines enforced disappearances as a 
crime against humanity. The failure to provide information in the case of those 
missing is named as an element of the crime itself, rather than as an aspect of the 
remedy.  
Fourthly, a decision concerning the procedural rights of victim participants, suggests 
that the topic of a victim’s right to the truth is of relevance, with a single judge noting 
that ‘the victims’ core interest in the determination of the facts, the identification of 
those responsible and the declaration of their responsibility’ formed the basis of the 
right to truth in respect of serious human rights violations.5  
And finally, the reparation mandate of the ICC leaves scope to contemplate whether 
the right to truth could influence reparations decisions: The first reparations decision 
confirmed the non-exhaustive nature of the possible reparations, noting that ‘[o]ther 
types of reparations, for instance those with a symbolic, preventative or 
transformative value, may also be appropriate.’6  
There are, however barriers to the emergence and realisation of the right to truth at 
the Court. This includes the role of the Prosecutor: her selection of situations, cases 
and charging itself can be perceived from the victims’ points of view as arbitrary. 
Some investigation decisions may limit the emergence of truth. And therefore 
consultation with victims has been suggested as important at this stage. Similar 
                                                          
5 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, Decision on the 
Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victims at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-
01/07-474, 13 May 2008, para. 32.  
6 Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 August, 2012, para. 222. 
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concerns over  charging decisions (the selection of offences and modes of offending) 
exist. The argument is that victims should have enhanced legal rights to seek control 
over charging. In essence, a lack of a possibility of challenging the prosecutor is 
what arguably hinders victims in their attempt to enhance the truth finding process; 
and more importantly, perhaps, when challenging a decision which resulted in a 
negative outcome, to receive an explanation as to why that decision has been taken.  
Fair trial concerns have been voiced: Any attempt to expand the breadth of truth-
seeking activity and disclosure by the court is likely to result not only in practical and 
jurisprudential difficulties, but risks impinging upon the defendant’s right to a fair and 
expeditious trial.  
However, due to the second innovative feature at the ICC, namely the reparation 
phase, there might be scope there to argue for the realisation of the right to truth. 
Pursuant to Article 75, reparation may be awarded to victims with reparation 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. In the final report of the focal 
point on stocktaking exercise of international criminal justice at the Review 
Conference in Kampala it was expressly recognized that with regards to victim 
participation and reparation a key challenge was 
 
(ix) Developing mechanisms to address reparations at the national level and help 
to facilitate victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations, with a particular focus 
on ensuring access and benefits for women and children.7 
 
Identifying the advancement of the right to truth as a challenge implies that it is 
linked to, if not forming part of, the Court’s mandate, remit and objectives with 
regards to reparation. Numerous submissions to the Court with regards to reparation 
are in agreement with this suggestion. However, without a conviction there can be no 
reparation. To date the decision in the Lubanga case is the first regarding 
reparations. It is clear from this decision that during the reparations proceedings the 
Courts’ primary concern are the victims, whilst prosecution and defence remain 
parties to the proceedings and that here the chamber is determined to read the 
statute in a flexible and broad manner to allow for the widest possible remedies.  
 
                                                          
7 RC/11, annex V(a) Stocktaking of international criminal justice, The impact of the Rome Statute system 
on victims and affected communities, Final report by the focal points (Chile and Finland), Appendix III 
Discussion Paper, at 101. 
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The current status quo 
Whilst neither the Rome Statute nor the accompanying documents include express 
reference to the right to truth, arguably there is enough flexibility within the Rome 
Statute to warrant an exploration of the relationship between the right to truth and the 
truth seeking obligations contained within the Rome Statute to increase our 
understanding of the extent to which this is theoretically possible.  
Furthermore, it is worth stressing that one of the key findings is that the 
research question is far more than platitudinous: real dialogue as to what, how and 
to what extent victims’ right should feature at the ICC is taking place with the content 
contested. Without doubt the importance of victims being able to ascertain the truth 
is recognised at the Court. But whether an international criminal justice mechanism 
is a good and viable means to achieve this aim is questionable. To some extent this 
can be linked to the fundamental question of what the point and purpose of a 
criminal trial is. These are conceptual and intellectual differences are also illustrated 
in dissenting judgments and in different approaches taken by the chambers. There is 
no reason to think these differences are negative factors. Rather, they appear as 
effective points of dialogue within the Court through which the most appropriate 
realisation of victims’ rights to the truth can emerge through a criminal process; to 
complement, perhaps, its emergence in other forms through other processes such 
as human rights law. 
For now, despite the fact that the right to truth is firmly embedded within 
human rights law and the transitional justice discourse, the Statute obligations may 
only lead to a limited realisation of this right at the ICC. Given the Prosecutor’s 
current preliminary investigations in Honduras, Colombia and Guinea expressly 
referring, inter alia, to enforced disappearance, the issues surrounding the right to 
truth are likely to be subject to future judicial analysis and decision at the Court. 
